In the mid-to-late 1980s, Cunard launched an ambitious project aimed at modernizing and revitalizing their fleet. Similar to the ill-fated Q3 saga, this project was also to replace an aging Queen. At the time, Cunard’s flagship was the iconic ocean liner Queen Elizabeth 2, but they also operated several cruise ships, including the 17,500gt Cunard Countess and Cunard Princess, along with converted ocean liners Sagafjord and Vistafjord, which were originally built for the Norwegian American Line.
Cunard’s project team focused heavily on new cruise ships, recognizing the growing pressure to maintain their standing as a premium operator in an increasingly competitive market.
Around this period, Cunard also explored entering the Hawaiian cruise market from the West Coast of the United States. In partnership with the hotel chain Hyatt and Tampa Shipyards, a project was proposed in 1988 for two American-built ships, each with a capacity of around 1,500 passengers. However, significant challenges emerged, similar to the ones faced nowadays with building US-flagged, Jones Act vessels. These complications eventually resurfaced as Cunard’s “Eagle” project. A story that warrants a deeper dive in it’s own right.
By 1987, Cunard had just invested over £100 million to convert the Queen Elizabeth 2 from a steam turbine powerplant to a diesel-electric one, extending her lifespan by about 20 years, all the while making her more cost effective to operate. Still, there was a growing sense that planning for her eventual replacement should start sooner rather than later. This project even having the support from Cunard’s owner, Trafalgar House.
Dubbed internally as the “Q5,” the ship was envisioned as a new flagship capable of both transatlantic crossings and worldwide cruises, with a projected lifespan of 40 to 50 years. The first design concept called for a 984ft LOA liner with a transatlantic draft of 35 feet and a gross tonnage of 90,000 GT. It was designed to carry up to 3,800 passengers and crew, divided into four classes, similar to today’s class structure on Cunard ships:
- 538 Tourist class cabins
- 285 First class cabins
- 225 Deluxe cabins
- 75 Penthouse cabins
A notable design shift was that 75% of the passenger cabins would be outside cabins — a significant departure from the QE2’s design. However, a controversial feature that was eventually discarded was the idea of a 900-seat buffet-style dining room exclusively for the 1,076 Tourist-class passengers, supplemented by an additional 200-passenger outdoor buffet open to all guests.
A feature that was uncovered only when analyzing her general arrangement (deck plans) was the discovery of a hatch on deck 5 and 4, both port and starboard, that would have housed two tenders of significant size. These would have been over twice the size of her regular tender boats that double as lifeboats. This is similar to Project Phoenix or a kin to the two tender boats that the s/s Norway had just aft of her forecastle.
Several propulsion options were then considered for the Q5, designed around a three-shaft configuration. The debate centered on how to generate electricity to power the three propellers. One proposal involved using high and low pressure turbines to deliver 97,855 hp to the two outer propellers and 107,238 hp to the center propeller, with additional generators powering onboard hotel services. There were even discussions about alternative fuel sources, including coal, diesel, heavy fuel oil, and avgas.
The ship’s required speed was another contentious issue. As a dual-purpose vessel for both transatlantic crossings and cruising, balancing high-speed crossings with fuel-efficient cruising presented a challenge. The initial target was a transatlantic speed of 37.5 knots — for context, the SS United States, built in 1952, held a service speed of 30 knots but could reach 38 knots when pushed.
As the project advanced toward finalizing the design, disagreements arose within Cunard and Trafalgar House. Executives in the UK and the U.S.-based marketing team in Florida had conflicting views on the ship’s purpose and market positioning. Even the ship’s exterior design couldn’t be agreed upon, prompting Cunard to hire a Norwegian design firm to create a new proposal that iterated on the previous existing Q5 concepts. The result was a sleek, overly modern, futuristic looking 1,000-foot vessel with a distinctive three-funnel design raked at a sharp angle, mirrored by the radar mast. The proposed service speed was increased to 41 knots, with a top speed of 44 knots, and the passenger capacity was reduced to 2,500.
However, the project collapsed when Trafalgar House withdrew its support, citing escalating costs despite securing £400 million in funding. By 1995, the Q5 project was officially abandoned. In 1996, Trafalgar House was acquired by Kværner (of Kværner-Masa Yards fame). The Norwegian shipbuilding and offshore conglomerate then sold a controlling 62% stake to Carnival Corp. Two years later Carnival bought the rest of the shares. Carnival quickly outlined plans for two 84,000 GT ships carrying about 2,000 passengers each, but this idea was scrapped in favor of a single vessel exceeding 100,000 GT and accommodating over 2,500 passengers. The final design was developed by Steven Payne, one of Carnival’s in-house naval architects into the Queen Mary 2.
The Q5 project’s drawn-out development highlighted not only technical and financial challenges but also deeper strategic conflicts between Cunard’s British and American leadership teams. The ship’s design process exposed fundamental differences in Cunard’s operating philosophies, which ultimately contributed to the project’s downfall and Cunard Line’s move into the Carnival family.